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This project analyzes the price behavior of Hang
Seng Index Futures contracts from the first day of
trading in May, 1986 through the expiration of the
January, 1987. contract. The focus of the analysis is
whether there were any exploitable arbitrage
opportunities due to mispricing of the contract.
Arbitrage opportunities exist if futures prices deviate
from their theoretical values by an amount large enough
to cover transactions costs. The primary finding of
this investigation is that the actual-futures prices
in general exceed the theoretical futures prices,
giving rise to arbitrage opportunities. The arbitrage
opportunities were examined under various assumptions
about the transaction costs faced by arbitrageurs with
different operational efficiency. The findings. indicate
that, because of the immaturity of the new market,
there were ample opportunities for even the less
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The history of stock index futures is not very
long, but these contracts have quickly established an
important position in the futures market. In February,
1982, the Kansas City Board of Trade introduced the
first stock index futures contract which was based on
the Value-Line Composite Index. This event was welcomed
by many investors. Contracts on the Standard and Poor's
500 Index and the New York Stock Exchange Composite
Index, subsequently introduced by the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange and New York Futures Exchange,
respectively, have also been very successful. Following
their success, a number of stock index futures
contracts have been established world-wide. Two notable
examples are the contracts traded in Sydney (All
Ordinaries Share Price Index Futures) and Singapore
(Nikkei Stock Average Index Futures Contract). Finally,
the concept spread to Hong Kong as a futures contract.
was introduced by the Hong Kong Futures Exchange on May
6, 1986 on the Hang Seng Index. Undoubtedly, this event
marked a new era in the development of the Hong Kong
financial market in its effort to establish itself as
the financial center of the Far East region.
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This project analyzes the price behavior or Hang
Seng Index Futures contracts from the beginning of
trading through the expiration of the January 1987
contract. The focus of the analysis is to discover
whether there were any exploitable arbitrage opportuni-
ties due to mispricing of the contract. This report
starts by reviewing briefly the index futures contracts
and its underlying stock market index. A discussion of
the pricing experiences of its American counterparts
then follows. The methodology, theory and the empirical
analysis are presented in the later portions of the
report. Arbitrage opportunities are examined under
various assumptions about the transaction costs faced
by arbitrageurs with different operational efficiency.
The main finding of this investigation is that, becausE
of the immaturity of the new market, there were ample
opportunities for even the less efficient arbitrageurs
to tap this market for profits.
3CHAPTER II
THE HANG SENG INDEX FUTURES
II.1 The Nature of Stock Index Futures
A stock index future is a stanaaraizea conzraW. Uu
a stock price average, or index, which is settled some
time in the future.. Simply put, it.is a commitment to
participate in the overall price movement of the stock
market as measured by the underlying stocks.
A stock index futures contract is based on a
portfolio of stocks represented by an underlying index,
and-trading the stock index futures contract means
trading the market value of this portfolio. As a type
of futures contract, it is traded on the futures
exchange. On the other hand, it is related to the stock
market since what is traded is a stock market
indicator. Hence, in some aspects, the index futures
contract can be viewed as a hybrid of .the stock and
futures markets.
To be more precise, the Hang Seng index futures
contract can be defined as an agreement-between two
parties, a buyer and a seller, to pay or receive .$50
4
times the difference between the initial rur-ures
transaction price and one of the following:
(1) The offsetting futures transaction price
(2) The daily futures settlement price or
(3). The final settlement price of the underlying
1
index on the day the contract expires.
These.differences are measurea by the settlement
price of. the Hang Seng Index. On the settlement of a
futures contract, positive differences are paid by
sellers and received by buyers whilst negative
differences are paid by buyers and received by the
sellers.
11.2 Hang Seng Index
The Hang Seng Index is calculated with the
Weighted Market Capitalization Method. Thirty-three
major stocks form the index which basically includes
the most reputable blue-chip corporations. Taken
together, these stocks represent over 75% of the total
Hong Kong Stock Market capitalization. The
representativeness of the Hang Seng Index as a
sensitive barometer of general stock market trend is
1. Wunsch R. Steven,Comparative Guide to Stock Index
Futures Contract, in Fabozzi, Frank J. and Gregory M.
Kipnis, Stock Index Futures, Homewood, Ill.: Dow Jones-
Irwin, (1984):25-33.
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widely recognized, notwithstanding that no precise
correlation of.their relationship has been calculated
and released by.any authority. The index is calculated
based on the prices of these thirty-three stocks and
the base rate is chosen as July 31, 1964 when the value
of the index on that day was set at 100.
The Hang Seng Index on any particular day is
computed as follows. The total market capitalization of
all constituent stocks is first obtained (market
capitalization of each stock is the market price of the
stock multiplied by its number of issued shares), which
is then divided by the total market capitalization on
the base date. The final step of arriving at the index
of any particular day.is to multiply the result by the
assigned index value of 100. Expressed in mathematical
fnrm_ this ice!
Stocks' Market. Capitalization at T'
HSI=
Stocks' Market Capitalization at T
Index Value at T (II.1)
In the formulation, T is the base day, T' is any
particular day after T and the index value at T is set
at 100. See Table 1 for an illustration of the
comnui-at-i can
Of course, changes in the composition of
constituent stocks in the index would have to be made
6
TABLE 1
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE COMPUTATION















If the assigned market index to the total





7on a continuous basis so as to accurately reflect the
overall performance of the market. A number of
deletions and additions as a result of mergers and
acquisitions as well as the changing importance of the
constituent stocks have taken place over time. See
Table 2 for the most recent list of the stocks and
their respective weights composing the Hang Seng Index
and Table 3 for a summary of performance of.,the Hang
Senq Index over the past ten years.
11.3 Hang Seng Index Futures Contract
Because the Chicago Mercantile Exchange did
excellent pioneer work in designing index futures,
specifically the famous Standard and Poor's 500
contracts, the subsequently introduced contracts
elsewhere uniformly adopted the Chicago form of
trading. The Hang Seng Index Futures contract is no
exception. The contract details of four major stock
index futures, including the Hang Seng and the Standard
and Poor's 500 contracts, are presented in Tables 4.1
to 4.4.
The characteristics of the Hang Seng Index Future:
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2.29Com Ind Sub-index 35.52
HANG SENG INDE) 2.63 100.00
Notes: (1) Historical figures are used in
computing dividend yield.
(2)# change in HSI (points) per dollar
change in stock price.
Source: South China Morning Post March 8, 1987
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746.0284 1206.83 1008.54 185,053
1220.741762.5185 1567.56 262,354
1598.502134.8086 1781.74 329,964
Source: Hong Kong Stock Exchange




FEATURES OF STOCK INDEX FUTURES CONTRACTS
Kansas City Board of Trade
(KCBE)
Kansas City(1 1 Locatior.
(2) Underlying market Value Line Composite (VLA)
This is an equally weightedmarket
index of approximately 1700
stocks. Geometric average
is used.
Five hundred times the Value(3) Contract size
(value of Line average (about $65,000)
contract)
Tick size is 0.01 points the(4) Minimum price
minimum change would causechange
the value of the contract to
chance by $5
Five points daily price limit(5) Daily price
change is in effect. Each point
represents $500
Initial Maintenance(6) Margins (min.
margin Tradermargincustomer margin
Speculatorset by the $2000$6500
Hedgerexchange) $1500$250
Spreaders$40 $200
Cash settlement. Actual value(7) Delivery concept
of VLA determines the payment
Final settlement is the last
trading day of the expiring
months._Delivery months are
March, June, September and
December.
4,077 lots(8) Volume of




SOURCE: Modest and Sundaresan,The Relationship Between
Spot and Futures Prices in Stock Index Mark' ts:
Some Preliminary Evidence. 18-19.
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TABLE 4.2




(2) Underlying market Standard and Poor's 500 Index
(SP500). This is a value-market
weighted index of 500 stocks.
Arithmetic average is used.
Five hundred times the SP(3) Contract sizE
(value of index (about $60,000)
contract)
Tick size is 0.05 points.(4) Minimum price
This represents a change ofchange
$25 per tick.
No limits currently in effect.(5) Daily price
change
Initial Maintenance(6) Margins (min.
margin margin. Tradercustomer margin
Speculatorset by the $6000 $2500
Hedgerexchange) $2500 $1500
Spreaders$400 $200
Cash settlement. Actual value(7) Delivery
of SP 500 index determinesconcept
the payment. Final settlement
of open contracts occurs on the
third Thursday of the delivery
month. Delivery months are
March, June, September and
December.
(8) Volume of 13,708 lots




SOURCE: Modest and Sundaresan,The Relationship
Between Spot and Futures-Prices in Stock




FEATURES OF STOCK INDEX FUTURES CONTRACTS
New York Futures Exchnange
(NYSE)
(1) Location New York
(2) Underlying market NYSE Composite Index. It is
market a valued-weighted average of
all common stocks listed on
the NYSE. Arithmetic average
is used.
(3) Contract size Five hundred times the NYSE
(value of composite index
contract)
(4) Minimum price Tick size is 0.05 points.
change This represents a change of
$25 Der tick.
No limits currently in effect.(5) Daily price
change
Initial Maintenance(6) Margins (min.
customer margin margin margin Trader
set by the Speculator$3500 $1500
exchange) Hedger$1500 $750
Spreaders$200 $100
(7) Delivery Concept Cash settlement. Actual value of
NYSE composite determines the pay-
ment. Settlement is based on the
difference between the settlement-
price on the next to the last day
of trading in the composite index
at the close of trading. Delivery
months March, June,. September and
December.
(8) Volume of 4',356 lots




SOURCE: Modest and Sundaresan,The Relationship Between




FEATURES OF STOCK INDEX FUTURES CONTRACTS
Hang Seng Index Futures Contract
(HSIF)
(1)Location Hong Kong
(2) Underlying market Hang Seng Index. It is a value-
market weighted average of 33 major
common stocks. Arithmetic average
is used.
(3) Contract size HK$50 times the Hang Seng Index
ahnut HKS125.000 Ai- TndPx 25nn1(value of
contract)
Tick size is 1 point.. This(4) Minimum price
change represents HKS50.
100 index points above or(5) Daily price
change or below preceding day's
settlement pricer-except as
provided by the Rule of
Expanded Daily Limits.
Initial Maintenance(6) Margins (min.
customer margin
set by the HK$ 12,000 HK$ 8,400
exchange) (After Jan. 12, 1987)
(7) Delivery concept Cash Settlement. Actual Value
of Hang Seng Index on the
last trading day determines
the settlement price.
Contracts are delivered every
months-
(8) Volume of 10,025 lots












The.Hang Seng Index Futures contract or the Hong
Kong Futures Exchange is traded in integers with a
minimum price fluctuation of one index point and each
point is equivalent in value to HK$50. In other words,
each contract is worth 50 times the quoted futures
price. For example, if the prevailing futures index is
traded at 3000, the value of the contract is $150,000
which is determined by $50 times 3000.
The contract takes.the.torm of cash settlement
instead of physical delivery of the underlying
portfolio of stocks. The delivery months of the
contract are the spot month and the adjacent two
months, although more distant dates of delivery are
currently being considered by the Exchange management.
The last trading day of each delivery month is the same
as that of the stock market and the daily trading hours
also match those of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The
last day trading is permitted is the second to last day
of the delivery month. On the last trading day of a
month, for instance, January 31, 1987, the contracts
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being traded are those for February, March and April
expiration. The January contract will have-expired or
the previous day.
11.3.2 Margin Requirements
Margin in stock index futures has an altogether
different meaning and serves an altogether different
purpose than does margin in securities trading. The
main difference is that the futures margin is not a
form of down-payment which entitles the payer to
acquire the assets in question. Rather, it is solely a
deposit of.good faith money, ensuring that the
obligations of the contract will be honored. A trading
mechanism, mark-to-market, denotes that a transfer of
cash into or out of a customer's margin account, based
on the settlement prices, will be called for through
the International Guarantee Corporation Ltd. (ICCH) on
a daily basis.
There are two kinds of margin requirements,
initial and maintenance. Initial margin refers to the
minimum amount of an investor's equity in an account
sufficient for initiating a position in the futures
market. Maintenance margin is the minimum level of an
investor's equity that he must have in order to
continue his position in the futures market.
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The initial margin requirement, according to an
authority of the Hong Kong Futures Exchange, is set
deliberately slightly above 10% of the value of the
contract. In this regard, the margin has been increased
several times to keep pace with the increase in the
total capitalization of the Hang Seng Index constituent
stocks.
As required by the Futures Exchange, investors
have to made the margin payment in cash to brokers.
Then the brokers, being member firms of the Futures
Exchange, are required to deposit a portion of the
margin with the ICCH.(See the Appendix for a list of
member firms.) However, there exists several deviations
from the rule in the actual practice of margin posting.
According to market participants, large customers,
because of their bargaining power, are usually allowed
by the member firm to post smaller margin or to post
the margin with interest-earning securities.
Because of the Exchange's policy of encouraging
spread trading, the margin requirement for a spread
transaction'was set at a lower rate of HK$ 4,000, as of
December 4, 1986.
11.3.3 Commissions
Unlike their counterparts in the United States,
the commissions for the execution of the Hang Seng
18
Index Futures contracts are not negotiable. The round
trip cost of commissions for an intra-day trade and
overnight trade, as prescribed by the Futures Exchange,
are HK$ 120 and HK$ 200, respectively. In practice,
larger customers enjoy a discount as well. Information
gathered by the author suggests that 30% is the
customary discount.
11.3.4 Trading Mechanism
Two trading methods are currently in use. The one
used most frequently is the open outcry method where
traders are allowed to deal directly with each other.
This makes it possible for every trader in the pit to
hear and respond to every bid and asked.quote. The
chairman call method, on the other hand, takes place
twice per day at the closing and opening. Essentially,
it is an auction system for the determination of the
opening and closing futures prices.
11.3.5 Liquidity
To measure the depth or liquidity of the futures
-market, two different indicators are used: open
interest and turnover volume. Turnover volume refers to
the number of contracts that are traded in the course
of a day, whereas open interest denotes those contracts
that have not yet been closed out by an offsetting
19
round turn. Table 5 snows averages oz LiiuSu t.wv
measures for the Hang Seng Index Futures over the nine
months since trading in the contract began. It is clear
that both turnover volume and open interest have grown
impressively since the inception of trading. Average
daily turnover volume was about 10,025 lots in January,
1987 in contrast to 1,635 lots in May, 1986, a six fold
increase. For the same period, average daily open
interest increased seven fold from 1,891 lots to 13,395
lots. However, even in the later months of trading when
the market become more mature and stable, perhaps over
70% of trading volume is concentrated in the spot month
contract.
These two measures of liquidity are relevant in
that they give an indication of the capacity to enter
and exit from a futures position without disrupting the
market both in terms of pricing and timing. The depth
of the market makes possible the large-lot trading
usually-involved arbitrage strategies without much













10/ 86 185,377 7,3528,827
11/86 154,113 9,3167,706
12/86 161,007 7,319 9,362
1/87 180,457 10,025 13,395
Source: Author's calculation from various




ARBITRAGE IN THE STOCK INDEX FUTURES MARKET
III.1 Arbitrage Defined
Grabbe has defined arbitrage as
the simultaneous purchase and sale or
lending and borrowing of two assets or two
groups of equivalent assets in order to
form a price parity.
By so doing, an arbitrageur would earn a sure profit
while being exposed to little or no risk. Arbitrage
opportunities are commonplace in inefficient markets
ranging from commodities, futures and options to
currency. Although arbitrageurs earn exploitative
profits from mispricing in the market, paradoxically,
they serve a very important function in regulating the
accurate pricing of goods and securities. The stock
index futures-market is no exception as arbitrage,
activities may occur in this market.
2. Grabbe, J.O., International Financial-Markets, New
York: Elsevier, (1986):323.
22
III.2 Stock Index Futures Pricing Model
The derivation of a pricing model of stock index
futures should-be attributed primarily to the work done
3
by Cornell and French. Their theories of stock index
futures prices draw heavily on theories of the pricing
of commodity futures. What they have termed the
Perfect Market Model actually is a specialized form
of the general Cost-of-Carry model. Basically, the
cost-of-carry model reasons that futures prices should
be close to an alternative portfolio of cash assets
valued in future.'The valuation of the cash assets in
the future incorporates both the current cost of the
assets and the cost of carrying the assets to the
future. In the case of stock index futures,' the
interest that accrues on money necessary to purchase
stock is included. In the later stage of their
theoretical development, however, additional
modifications are made to incorporate the effects of
4,5
dividend yields, tax Davments and transaction costs.
3. Cornell, Bradford and Kenneth French, 1rie pricing
of Stock Index Futures,-The Journal of Futures
Markets, (Spring 1983):1-14.
4. Cornell, Bradford and Kenneth French, Taxes and
the Pricing of Stock Index Futures, The Journal of
Finance, (June 1983):675-679.
3. Cornell, Bradford Taxes and the Pricing
of Stock Index Futures, The Journal of Futures
Markets, (Spring 1985):89-101.
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In the most primitive form, the model incorporates
several relatively restrictive assumptions:
1. There is actual aelivery or Lne -jwun
index futures contract.
2. Forward prices and the futures prices
are equal.
3. Perfect divisibility of assets.
4. No transactions cost.
5. Dividends are known with certainty at
the outset and are paid at the end of
the holding period.
6. The interest rate is known at the outset
of the holding period.
7. There are no restriction on using the
short sales proceeds.
In mathematical Corm, Lne UEULeS PL-LLt U.L a




F(t,T)= futures price at time t for a contract
maturing at time T.




r= risk-free rate of interest prevailing
at t.
d= size of the dividend payment.
Certain assumptions are then relaxed and the rinal
version only retains the following assumptions:
1. Forward and futures prices are equal.
2. Perfect divisibility of assets.
The final version of their model is:
(111.2)
where
D(w)= instantaneous dividend payout at time
w.
R(t,w,T)= the forward rate on a loan considered
at time t, booked at time w, and
carried until time T.
(i)= ordinary income tax rate.
(g)= capital gains tax rate.
This. equation incorporates the stochastic behavior
of the interest rate, instantaneously paid dividends
25
and the differential treatment of ordinary income taxes
6
and capital gains taxes in the valuation model.
Empirical tests of the Perfect Market Model on
the Standard and Poor's 500 futures contract indicate
that actual prices of the futures are generally higher
than theoretical prices. Thus, the typical arbitrage
strategy will involve a short position in the futures
market and an offsetting position in the underlying
cash market. Of course, these are low-risk/low-return
types of strategies. However, because arbitrageurs are
capable of taking large positions on a continuous
basis, they may achieve substantial dollar profits.
At approximately the same time as Cornell and
7
French, Modest and Sundaresan also developed theories
of index futures prices. Because they use similar
arguments, they arrive at conclusions parallelling
those proposed by French and Cornell. However, they gc
further to discuss the existence of the no arbitrage
bound for futures prices. They argue that the futures
price can deviate from the theoretical price within a
zone in which no arbitrage profits can be made. In
6. Khoury, S.J., Speculative Markets, New York:
Manmillan Puh hinn rn 1 AQn
7. Modest, David and Mahadevan Sundares-an, The
Relationship between Spot and Futures Prices in Stock
Index Futures Markets: Some Preliminary Evidence, The
Journal of Futures Market. (Snrina 1931: 1-42_
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their empirical tests, however, they found that prices
frequently lay outside a bound such that large
institutional investors with low transactions costs
could earn arbitrage profits from the Standard and
Poor's 500 futures contract.
The mathematical formulation of their bound is
given by:
C (FL)= cost of being long in the futures
contract,
C(FS)= cost of being short in the futures
contract,.
C(PL)= cost of being long in the spot index, and
C(PS)= cost of being short in the spot index.




In summary, theorists agree that the pricing of
the stock index futures should be approached using the
cost of carry model or perfect market model. However.
27
empirical tests of these models show that:
(1) the actual futures prices do not seem to
behave as predicted in general, the
theoretical prices are lower.
(2) ample arbitrage opportunities appears to
exist for efficient participants in stock
index futures markets in the United States.
Although the validity of the cost-of-carry model
requires further testing, it is the only model that
comes close to approximating actual market prices of
8
stock index future contracts. For this reason, the
Cornell and French model is used throughout the present
report to estimate theoretical prices.
8. Khoury, S.J., Speculative Markets, New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co. 1984.
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Chapter IV
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES IN
THE HANG SENG INDEX FUTURES MARKET
This analysis focuses first on whether Hang Seng
Index futures contracts have been priced in accordance
with the cost-of-carry model. Then empirical evidence
concerning the ex post arbitrage opportunities in the
Hang Seng Index futures is generated. In the latter,
two categories of potential arbitrageurs who are
subiect to different transaction costs are considered.
The results presented here are based on analysis
Df the nine contracts traded from May, 1986 to January
1987. The days to maturity for the nine contracts,
however, varies considerably, ranging from 18 days for
the May, 1986 contract, to 82 days for the September,
1986 contract. Throughout the investigation,-the-cost-
of-carry model is taken as the standard for rational
futures prices. In general, whenever actual prices do
not conform to the prices derived from the cost-of-
carry model, arbitrage opportunities exist. Table 6




NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF AN ARBITRAGE
TRANSACTION
r= 12%Assume F(t,T)= $110
d= 5%P (t)= $100
At Time C
Futures MarketStock Market
Borrow $100 at 12% Sell the futures at $110




Buy the futures at $110Receive dividends of $5
Sell stocks for $110
Pay debt of $112
at $100
Prnf i i-= fiI Profit/Loss= $0
Total Profit=$ 3
Note: The example excludes transaction costs and the
change in the futures price over time, but it
would not impair its generality.
Source: Kolb, Robert W. Understanding Futures markets
Scott, Foresman and Company. (1985): 246
30
IV.1 Cost of Carry Model
For each of the contracts a simplified version of
the original cost-of-carry model as proposed by Cornell
and French has been employed to determine the theoreti-
cal price of Hang Seng futures contract. Explicitly,
the model is:
F (t,T) P (t)* (1+r+d) (IV.I)
where r and d have been annualized.
r the prevailing interest rate.
d the dividend yield of the futures
portfolio.
= the value of the index future.F (t,T)
the value of the cash index.P (t)
Taxes are ignored because in Hong Kong there is no
differential treatment of capital gains and ordinary
income. Also, since arbitrage opportunities are inves-
tigated in an ex post manner, the stochastic behavior
of dividends and the interest rate are ignored for
simplicity.
IV.2 Data Collection
'rnere is no clear cnoice tor the interest rate.to
use in computing the theoretical futures price. There
31
is -no risk-free interest rate in Hong Kong like the
Treasury bill rate in the United States. The two
logical Hong Kong alternatives are the prime interest
rate and HIBOR, the Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate.
The prime interest rate was selected for two reasons.
The first is that HIBOR appears to have been influenced
by speculative holdings of large amounts of Hong Kong
dollars by large banks. This results in large
fluctuations in the interbank lending rate. As the
arbitrage strategy involves relative stable investment
periods, the fluctuating interbank market does not
seems relevant. Thus, the use of the HIBOR as the bench
mark for the present purposes was deemed not suitable.
Secondly, the use of HIBOR further introduces
complications such as rates for different maturities
such as 2 days, one week, or even longer periods. In
contrast, the prime interest rate is simpler. It is
quite stable and this conservative rate was chosen as
the reference point. The values of the prime interest
rate for the sample period are shown in Table 7.
The dividend data used were taken from the weekly
report of the Hong Kong Economic Journal (See Table 8).
The reported dividend yields are ex post ones. The
dividend yields were calculated by dividing the
expected dividends as disclosed in annual-reports of
corporations or the actual dividend by the current-
32
TABLE 7
CHANGES IN THE PRIME INTEREST RATE:
1/1985- 1/1987
DAY YEAR PRIME RATE
JAN. 14 85 10.50%
JAN. 28 85 10.00%
APR. 1 85 9.50%
APR. 23 85 9.00%
MAY. 20 85 8.50%
JUN. 24 85 8.00%
JUL. 15 85 7.00%
JUL. 19 85 6.00%
SEP. 2 85 7.00%
APR. 2 86 8.00%
MAY. 12 86 7.50%
AUG. 16 86 6.50%
JAN. 15 86 5.00%
Source: Author's calculation from various issues

















Source: Author's calculation trom various issues
of the Hong Kong Economic Journal
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market price of the stock. The cilviaena aata ao not
satisfy the stringent requirement that they not only
should be dividend yields expected during the futures
contract trading period, but also should be adjusted
for seasonality of dividend payments. Both the effect
of the seasonality and the random nature of dividend
payments are beyond the scope of this investigation.
However, these measurements are expected to cause only
slight discrepancies between the model prices and the
true theoreticalrices.prices
In Hong Kong, short-selling in the cash market is
legally forbidden. This hampers the effectiveness of
the cash-of-carry argument in determining the futures
prices. If futures prices are far below actual prices,
.the no short-sell rule prevents arbitrageurs from
shorting the stocks while buying the futures and, thus,
driving the futures and cash prices to their
theoretical relationship. The arbitrage strategy still
can be implemented by investors who already hold a
portfolio of the index stocks. However, because of the
no short-sell rule, the strategy of selling short cash
market/long futures is not included in the discussion
that follows.
IV.3 Theoretical Price
Usingthe data series for the dividend yields,
35
interest rates and cash prices for the Hang Seng Index
theoretical prices of the Hang Seng Index futures were
calculated from equation IV.1. The theoretical and the
actual index prices over the sample period are dis-
played in Exhibits 1-10. Whenever the actual futures
price was above (below) the theoretical price, the
futures contract was overvalued (undervalued).
In Exhibit 1, the differences between the theore-
tical and actual futures prices of the May 1986
contract are depicted. Exhibit 2 shows the differences
in prices that is, the actual prices minus the theore-
tical prices. For example, on the first day of trading,
May 6, 1986, the actual futures settlement price was
1877 and the theoretical futures prices based on the
closing price of the Hang Seng Index (1858), was 1863.
These two figures are depicted on the appropriate
locations in Exhibit 1, while their difference, 1877-
1863•= 14, is magnified and depicted in Exhibit 2. For
the clarity of discussion, the magnified version was
chosen for presenting the other contract months in
Exhibit 3 to.Exhibit 10.
In general, the actual prices observed for the
stock index futures contracts are frequently and
substantially higher than theoretical futures prices
derived from the model. This is a surprising result
because thesame phenomenon have not been observed for
36
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stock index futures'traded elsewhere. Previous studies
on the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index and the
Standard Poor's 500 contracts have found that the
price structure of the futures contracts is generally
flatter than the simple arbitrage model predicts.
9
Cornell and French observe that the futures prices
are often below the spot price. The empirical behavior
of the Hang Seng Index futures prices fails to confirm
their observation. Thus, theoretically, arbitrage
profits could be earned by selling the Hang Seng
futures contracts and buying the consituent stocks.
According to the argument.set forth by Modest and
10
Sundaresan, however, a standard cost-of-carry model
which fails to give explicit recognition of the
transaction costs incurred in arbitrage is inadequate
for generating the theoretical prices. Due to these
frictions in the market, actual futures. prices can
fluctuate within a bounded interval around the
theoretical prices without giving rise to arbitrage
profits. In the sections that follow, the transactions
costs paid by arbitrageurs are specifically addressed.
9. Cornell, Bradford Taxes and the Pricing of Stock
Index Futures, The Journal of Futures Markets, (Spring
1985):89-101.
10. Modest, David and Mahadevan Sundaresan, The
Relationship between Spot and Futures Prices in Stock
Index Futures MArkets: Some Preliminary Evidence, The
Journal of-Futures Market, (Spring 1983): 15-42.
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In Chapter V. the question of whether market prices
diverge from theoretical price by more than
transactions costs, thereby allowing arbitrage profits,
is investiaated.
IV.4 No Arbitrage Bound
The no-arbitrage bound must be defined differently
for different sets of investors. Retail customers. pay
stock brokers full commissions and must also post the
index futures margin entirely in cash. Institutional
investors can negotiate to post interest-bearing
securities for margin. The margin required for member
firms in the Futures Exchange is only the portion whicr
is required to forwarded to ICCH. Some of the investor:
in index futures contracts are themselves stock
brokers. They are actually capable of saving an
enormous amount of money in buying the cash market
portfolio to implement the arbitrage strategy. Various
investors incur varying costs in accessing the markets
For simplicity, two categories of arbitrage bound have
been delineated in this project one for ordinary
retail customers called low-efficient arbitrageurs and
one for institutional investors called high-efficient
arbitrageurs.
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IV.4.1 Low Efficient Arbitrageur
The low efficient arbitrageur faces full retail
costs. The full transaction costs involved in
implementing the arbitrage strategy to exploit
overvalued futures contracts consist of the cost of
buying the spot stock portfolio and selling short the
futures contract.
Buvinq the cash index
Tax:
0.3% stamp duty on each act of buying and selling
0.025% transfer tax on each act of buying or
selling
In arbitraging, the buying cost is the value of
the cash index. The selling price of this portfolio is
the settlement price of the index when the theoretical
futures price, actual futures price and the cash index
converge at the expiration of the futures contrats.
Assuming that the buying price approximately equals the
selling price, the round trip tax costs will be double
the one-way cost or i.e., 0.6% stamp duty and 0.05%
transfer tax.
Bid-Asked Spread:
The bid-asked spread involved in-the buying and
selling the cash index is 0.7%.
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Securities Commission:
A round turn securities commission of 0.5% must'be
paid.
Shorting the futures contract
Margin:
The posting of margin to the clearing house
involves an opportunity cost which equals the product
of the per contract margin and the prevailing interest
rate adjusted for the dates to maturity. For example,
the prevailing margin before Oct 8, 1986 is$ 10,000
for taking a position in the contract (see Table 9).





If an investor takes an intraday position, a
futures commission of $200 has to be paid (see Table







SCHEDULE OF CHANGES IN TH:
MARGIN REQUIREMENTS OF





$ 3,000$ 7,000$ 10,000May 6 1986
$ 5,000Oct. 8 1986
$ 6,500$ 8,400$ 12, 000Jan. 12 1987
Source: Hong Kong Futures Exchange news release










Compensation Fund $0.5 $0.5
Source: Hong Kong Futures Exchange news release




High-efficient arbitrageurs enjoys a numuu.c Ui
privileges not available to low efficient ones. They
may be exempt from paying the opportunity cost of
margin payment. In spite of the stated margin cost,
they may be allowed to post interest-earning securities
as a substitute for cash margin. Thus, their
opportunity cost for margin is nil. Even if they must
post cash margin, the amount required is lower. For
example, when the prevailing margin was $10,000 for
non-member, member firms needed only to post$ 3,000 to





If the arbitrageur himselt is not only a member in
the Futures Exchanges, but also a stock broker himself,
the cost of stock commissions is negligible as well.
Commission costs will be excluded in the calculation of
the no arbitrage bound for this category of
arbitrageur.
Finally, both retail and institutional investors
may buy the stocks in the index on margin instead of
paying in full. The customary margin of up to 30% of
the stock value will significantly reduce their capital
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outlay. Unlike margin in the futures market, of course,
the margin requirement for stocks is a downpayment of
future purchase of the underlying stocks and interest
is charged on the balance.
In summary, the no arbitrage bound can be
expressed by an functional relationship:
NAB= f( t, T, M, SI, BAS, SC, FC)
where
t= Applicable tax rate.
T= Time to contract maturity.
M= Margin requirements.
SI= Spot index price.
BAS= Bid-Asked Spread in stock market.
SC= Stock market commission.
'FC= Futures market commission.
The specific values of the independent variables will
depend upon the particular arbitrageur. An increase in
any of the independent variables leads to an increase
in the dependent variable. The extent of the increment
in the no-arbitrage bound (NAB) is naturally contingent
upon the sensitivity of the NAB to the variable and the





The profits exploitable by the arbitrageurs are
determined by subtracting the no arbitrage bound (NAB)
from the difference between the theoretical price of
the futures contract and the actual futures price.
Thus, each profit (or loss) figure represents the
outcome of selling the futures contract and buying the
Hang Seng Index's constituent stocks on particular
date, maintaining the position until the expiration
date of the futures contract, and then closing the
entire position out. Each figure is an'after-
transaction costs profit or loss.
,The arbitrage profits for both the high-efficient'
and low-efficient arbitrageurs in the nine futures
contracts are depicted in the Exhibits 11 to 19. In
each exhibit, the 0 value on the vertical axis
represents the breakeven point where no loss or profit
would be incurred when the arbitrageurs entered the
market. Arbitrageurs could have entered-the market for
profits on the days where positive values appear in the
55
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exhibits. On the contrary, the arbitrageurs should
never enter the market on the days where negative
values appear because a loss would result from such a
move. The cost-of-carry model maintains that arbitrage
profits should never be positive, partcularly for low-
efficiency, high transactions cost arbitrageurs.
In Tables 11 and 12, the arbitrage profit
)pportunties for both the low- and high- efficient
arbitrageurs are summarized. The (a) column indicates
the total days of trading for each contract whilst the
(b) column represents the number of days when the
arbitrageurs cauld have tapped the market for profit by
simultaneously buying the stocks and selling the
futures contract. In column (c), the number of trading
days in which the actual futures price exceeded the
theoretical value by more than the arbitrage bound as a
percentage of the total numbers of trading days is
presented. Column (d) represents the maximum arbitrage
profit over the life of the contract in points per
contract. Thus, the actual maximum profit is the
reported figure times $50.
V.2 Discussion
This report provides a study of the price behavior
of Hang Seng Index Futures contracts. Theory suggests








OF EARNING PROFIT(b)/ (a)
MONTH CONTRACT DAYS VALUE
(a) (b) (c) (d)
MAY 18 4 22.2% 4
JUNE 37 16 43.2% 27
JULY 46 19 41.3% 22
AUGUST 43 11 25.6% 18
SEPTEMBER 82 33 4.0.2% 33
OCTOBER 62 11 17.7% 34
NOVEMBER 62 29 46.8% 56
DECEMBER 62 47 75.8% 65









OF EARNING PROFIT(b)/ (a)
MONTH CONTRACT DAYS VALUE
(a) (b) (c) (d)
-9MAY 18 0 0%
JUNE 37 4 L0.8% 13
JULY. 46 3 6.5% 7
AUGUST 43 2 4.7% 4
SEPTEMBER 82 20 24.4% 18
OCTOBER 62 1 1.6% 19
NOVEMBER 62 20 32.3% 39
DECEMBER 62 30 48.4% 49
JANUARY 6C 40 64.5% 61
Source: Author's calculation
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cost-of-carry model. When transaction costs are
reconized, actual futures prices should fluctuate
within a NAB (No Arbitrage Bound), thereby prohibiting
arbitrage profits.
The results of this study indicate several
interesting points. First, the exhibits and tables
clearly show that the high-efficient arbitrageurs at
all times dominate their low-efficient counterparts.
This is not surprising because the high-efficient
arbitrageurs are operating within a much smaller no
arbitrage bound. In keeping pace with the increase in
the general level of Hong Kong stock prices during this
period, the arbitrage bound for them has increased from
a low of 25 index points at the inception of trading of
the futures contracts to a high of 35 index points in
January, 1987. In contrast, the low-efficient
arbitrageurs were faced with a much wider no arbitrage
bound which grew from 39 to 53 index points over the
same period.
Most importantly, Tables 11 and 12 indicate that
there were many opportunities for both low- and high-
efficient arbitrageurs to tap the market for profits.
For example, of the 82 trading days for the September
contract, low-efficient ones could have entered the
market profitably on 20 days while the comaprable
f_ i_aures* hi ah-efficient arhi traaPrs is 33 days
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Similarly, for the December and July contracts, the
high efficiency arbitrageurs have 92 days of profit
opportunity of the 122-total days, whereas the low-
efficiency ones have 72 days over the same time span.
One observation is quite surprising. One idea
expressed in the literature is that initially arbitrage
opportunities may exist, but as the market matures the
arbitrage opportunities will be competed away. The
results of this study do not support this idea. Indeed,
the possible arbitrage profits show an increasing trend
with expanding profit opportunities in the October,
November., December and January contracts. Columns (c)
and (d) in both Tables 11 and 12 show both more
frequent mispricing (number of days of profit
opportunities) and larger mispricing (larger maximum
profits) in the more recent contracts. It should be
noted that the stock market experienced a strong bull
market over last3 or 4 months analyzed. So, the
increase in the premiums (futures prices relative to
the cash index market prices) appear to be associated
with rising stock prices and optimistic expectations of
market participants. Moreover, arbitrage did not force*
the futures prices back in line.
These results cast serious doubt on the validity
of the cost-of-carry model in tracking the Hang Seng
Index Futures contract. Most of the time the actual
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futures prices are higher than the theoretical prices
derived from the cost-of-carry model. The validity of
the cost-of-carry model in explaining the prices of
Hanq Sena Index Futures contracts is questionable.
The results show that actual futures prices
exceed the theorectical ones by so large an amount
that arbitrage profits can be made by investors who
have to pay transaction costs. The local Hong Kong
historical experience reveals that the arbitrage
opportunites do exist are for a long stock/short
futures position. Interestingly, this is in contrast to
the trading experience in the United States where the
arbitrage opportunites consistently avaliable are for
the high efficency traders who can access the market
with low short sales costs in a short stock/long
futures position.
Several quantifications about this study and the
conclusions drawn should be noted. Only the daily
closing prices of the Hang Seng Index and daily
settlement prices of the Hang Seng Index futures were
used. It must be noted that the intraday variation of
both the index and the futures prices is quite large.'
Thus, the basis, which is the difference between the
futures price and cash index price, 'that have been
used in the analysis may not be representative. Actual
participants in the market may have gained much more or
70
less profit than that the analysis indicates.
The extent to which arbitrage profits could have
earned has been only touched upon in this research. The
focus of the investigation has revolved around the
opportunities for arbitrage only using one simple
strategy. Other strategies such as a trading technique
known as rollover have not been considered. In
essence, rollover is a technique which may increase
the profits by significantly reducing transaction
costs. Rollover invloves arbitrageurs shifting from one
futures contract to another while holding the same
portfolio of the underlying stocks, thereby efficiently
curtailing the transaction costs in the buying and
selling of stocks. By so doing, transaction costs such
as stock broker commissions, transfer-taxes and the






THE HANG SENG INDEX FUTURES EXCHANGE
1'. ALPHA BEST COMMODITIES CO. LTD.
2. ANDERSON MAN (INVESTMENT SERVICES) LTD.
3. BERITA LTD.
4. BONSAR LTD.
5. CHART TOP LTD.
6. CHEERFUL (INTERNATIONAL) SECURITIES INVESTMENT
LTD.
7. CHEIF INVESTMENT CO.
8. CHEUNG PAK WONG (TRADING AS LEADER INT'L TRADING
CO.)
9. 'CHEUNG'S COMMODITY TRADERS LTD.
101. CHINE KIT LTD.
11. CHINTUNG FUTURES LTD.
12. CHOW SANG SANG COMMODITIES LTD.
13. CHUNG FAT INVESTMENT CO.
14. CHUNG MAO COMMODITIES FUTURES LTD.
15. CREACITY CO. LTD.
16. CZARNIKOW RIONDA (HK) LTD.
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17. DANNY FUTURES CO.
18. DIAMOUNT COMMDITIES LTD.
19. F.E.B. COMMODITIES LTD.
20. FINEHING LTD.
21. FIRST PACIFIC FUTURES LTD.
22. FOREGROUNG COMMODITIES CO.
23. FOREX COMMODITIES LTD.
24. FUJI H.K. COMMODITIES CO. LTD.
25. FULLYTEX INVESTMENTS LTD.
26. GOLDEN HARVEST STOCK INVESTMENT CO.
27. GOLDSTOCK COMODITY (HK) LTD.
28. HOARE GOVETTE ASIA FUTURES LTD.
29. HONGNET LTD.
30. I.C.A. ENTERPRISE CO.LTD.
31. INFAST FUTURES LTD.
32. JAMES CAPEL FAR EAST FUTURES LTD.-
33. •JAN SIN MEE COMMODITIES LTD.
34.' JARDINE FLEMING FUTUES LTD.
35. JOYEE INVESTMENT (HK) LTD.
36. KEVIN CO.
37. KING FOOK COMMODITIES CO.LTD.
38. KINGLY COMMODITIES CO. LTD.
39. KOBAYASHI (HK) LTD.
40. KWONG FAT HONG FUTURES LTD.
41. NORMAN KONG COMMODITIES LTD.
42. SHUN LEE CO.
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43. LEE FUNG HONG GOLD, SILVER JEWELLERY CO. LTD.
44. A ONE FUTURES CO.
45. MALAHON SECURITIES EXCHANGE LTD.
46. MANISHING INVESTMENT LTD.
47. MANSION HOUSE COMMODITIES LTD.
48. MERRILL LYNCH-SUN HUNG KAI (OVERSEAS SECURITIES)
CO. LTD.
49. MIYAKO TRADING CO. LTD.
50. NEW CENTURY FINANCIAL FUTURES LTD.
51. 0 S (COMMODITIES) LTD.
52. OKACHI INTERNATIONAL CO. LTD.
53. ONAPAL LTD.
54. ONG COMMODITIES (HK) LTD.
55. OSTAS LTD.
56. PAK SHING COMMODITIES CO.LTD.
57. PAK TAK COMMODITY CO.
58. PANIN COMMODITIES LTD.
59. PHILIPPE RO CO.
60. PHYLLIS ESTATE LTD.
61. PLAN GOOD INVESTMENT LTD.
62. PLAQUE ENTERPRISES LTD.
63. POLOSUM TRADING LTD.
64. PAK LOK COMMODITIES CO.
65. REPUBLIC CLEARING (HK) LTD.
66. RESIDENTS INTERNATIONAL LTD.
67. RESPECTABLE INVESTMENT CO. LTD.
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68. RICHARDSON GREENSHIELDS OF CANADA (PACIFIC) LTD.
69. RING KUN CO. LTD.
70. ROCTEC FUTURES TRADING CO.
71. SCHRODERS ASIA FUTURES LTD.
72. SEIO COMMODITIES TRADERS (HK) LTD.
73. SHIN TOH COMMODITIES CO. LTD.
74. SHUN LOONG COMMODITIES CO.
75. SIU YIP COMMODITY LTD.
76. SOLID FUTURES CO.
77. SUN HUNG KAI COMMODITIES LTD.
78. SUN HUNG KAI INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES LTD.
79. SUN WING YUEN SECURITIES CO.
80. SUN'S INVESTMENT CO. LTD.
81. SUNRAY FUTURES LTD.
82. TAK FUNG COMMODITIES LTD.
83. TALENT PROFIT LTD.
84. TARZAN STOCK INVESTMENT CO.
85. THE SOUTH-SEAS INVESTMENT CO. LTD.
86. TOKYO COMMODITY LTD.
87. TROIKA INVESTMENT LTD.
88. UNICORN SEVURITIES CO.
89. VIVA COMMODITIES LTD.
90. VICKERS DA COSTA FUTURES LTD.
91. WARDLEY-THOMSON FUTURES H.K. LTD.
92. WING FAT INDEX CO. LTD.
93. WINFULL COMMODITIES ANALYSIS LTD.
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94. WINTAKLY COMMODITY LTD.
95. WISE GAIN CO. LTD.
96. WOCOM COMMODITIES LTD.
97. YOUNGS FAMILY INVESTMENT CO,
98. YU ON COMMODITIES CO. LTD.
99. YUE LEE TRADING CO. LTD.
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